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‘Let the ideas fall where they may’: Quine, Publicity, and Pre-Established Harmony   
Gary Kemp 
1.  It is natural to think that Quine favoured the ‘publicity’ of meaning.  The first sentence of the 
preface of Quine’s Word and Object is ‘Language is a social art’ (1960, ix).  Over and over he denied 
the cogency of a ‘mentalistic’ theory of meaning—an account which consigns the crucial facts of 
meaning to a private mental realm.  For example in the Roots of Reference:  
Language, we are told, serves to convey ideas…Now how do we know that these ideas are 
the same? And, so far as communication is concerned, who cares? We have all learned to 
apply the word ‘red’ to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, and boiled lobsters. The associated 
idea, the associated sensation, is as may be. (1974, 35) 
Blood, tomatoes, ripe apples and boiled lobsters are quintessentially public things; we ‘have all 
learned to apply the word[s]’ to them.   
Let us characterise the ‘Publicity Requirement’ as the demand that language not be described in 
terms of entities unamenable to intersubjective scrutiny; it must be described in terms of the 
intersubjective or third-person cognitive interaction with ordinary facts, objects, or events, of a sort 
that is jointly available to normal language-users.  What is ruled out, most obviously, are schemes 
such as Russell’s in 1910 that saw private sense-data as the things we fundamentally talk about.  In 
1952, though with an eye on epistemology rather than semantics, Quine writes:   
I suggest that it is a mistake to seek an immediately evident reality, somehow more 
immediately evident than the realm of external objects. Unbemused by philosophy, we 
would all go along with Dr. Johnson, whose toe was his touchstone of reality. (1952, 225) 
Further dimensions of Quine’s observance of something like the Publicity Requirement are not far to 
seek.  In ‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions’ of 1975, with at least one eye on semantics he repeats the 
point of The Roots of Reference quoted above:  
… the fixed points are just the shared stimulus and the word; the ideas in between are as 
may be and may vary as they please, so long as the external stimulus in question stays 
paired up with the word in question for all concerned. The point is well dramatized by the 
familiar fantasy of complementary colour perception. Who knows but that I see things in 
colour opposite to those in which you see the thing? For communication it is a matter of 
indifference. (1975, 2481) 
Quine connects this theme with behaviourism:   
The behavioural level, in between [the mental and the physiological], is what we must settle 
for in our descriptions of language, in our formulations of semantical rules, and in our 
explications of semantical terms… These things need to explained, if at all, in in behavioural 
terms.. (emphasis added; 1975, 248) 
The relevant behavior is equated with the use of language.  In ‘Use and Its Place in Meaning’,2 Quine 
wrote:  
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Wittgenstein has stressed that the meaning of a word is to be sought in its use.  This is 
where the empirical semanticist looks: to verbal behavior … we can take the behavior, the 
use, and let the meaning go. (1981, 46).   
The distinction between use and linguistic behavior might be thought to reside in the difference 
between a normative conception of use versus a purely descriptive conception of behaviour, but for 
my purposes I will set the normativity issue aside and accept Quine’s assimilation.  (Quine says 
elsewhere such things as that ‘in linguistics one has no choice’ but to accept behaviourism; 1992, 37; 
1987, 341).   
Quine considers mental phenomena generally—thinking, feeling, perceiving, and so on—as 
systematically behaviourally manifestable, even if in individual cases they exist when not actually 
manifested.  Quine draws an analogy with diseases:  
… we may do well to reflect on how we learn the mentalistic terms in the first place. All talk 
about one’s mental life presupposes external reference. Introspect our mental states as we 
will, how do we know what to call them? How did we learn to call our anxieties anxieties, 
how dull aches dull aches, our joy joys, and our awareness awareness?  Why do we suppose 
that what we call joys and anxieties are what other people call by those names? How we 
know what we talking about? Clearly the answer is that such terms are applied in the light of 
publicly observable symptoms. …   I am not applying the terms to behavior.  A mental state is 
not always manifested in behavior. Physically construed, it is a state of nerves. We can say 
which state it is, however, and tell one from another, without knowing the neural 
mechanism. … Mental states … are like diseases. A disease may be diagnosed in light of 
observable signs though the guilty germs be still unknown to science.  (1985, 323-4; Quine’s 
emphasis) 
But there is a difficulty.  The difficulty is that it is far from straightforward how to fit in detail Quine’s 
view of language to the Publicity Requirement.   In addition to its ban on mental or private entities 
playing a role in linguistic explanation, the Publicity Requirement also seems to rule out an 
‘internalist’ or ‘individualistic’ conception of language, according to which the essential facts are not 
public in the requisite sense, even if they are not essentially or irreducibly mental or private.  Yet as 
we’ll see Quine’s mature view is that at least some of those essential facts are internal or individual.  
And his view of whether meaning is public complicates matters further.  In one sense of ‘meaning’, 
he holds that as a simple question of the significance or lack of it of linguistic items—whether a 
certain object or event, or kind of object or event, is meaningful in the first place—the matter is 
indeed settled by linguistic behaviour.  But in another sense of the term his view is that the question 
carries a false assumption: that there is a well-grounded scientific answer to it.  He denies the 
possibility of a scientific theory of meaning, in the sense of a rigorous, empirically adequate account 
of the particular meanings of sentences or statements.  He was sceptical of the idea from the get-go 
but such is one of the most notable conclusions of his central book Word and Object.   
Quine does think that there is a phenomenon ordinarily called ‘meaning’, even though it must be 
conceived in a revisionary way.  As became explicit especially in Quine’s work in the years after Word 
and Object, he thought it possible rigorously to describe the use of language, linguistic behaviour, so 
as to account for cognitive or referential use of language, in ways that are themselves scientific (as in 
Roots of Reference).  It is possible to describe it in ways that do not go beyond the bounds of what 
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he termed his naturalism, but that does not add up to an account of meaning in the classical sense, 
of propositions and concepts.   That phenomenon, one might think,  is public, almost by definition.  
But there are further relevant complexities in Quine‘s views, and there is a crucial dimension that did 
not fully emerge until after Word and Object.  These pull in opposite directions.  The complexities 
concern the fact that, unlike the case with Davidson, there is the appearance, at least, that Quine 
was committed to a proximate rather than a distal conception of reference; he thus appears to 
substitute the privacy of one’s own nerves for mentalistic privacy, thus contravening the Publicity 
Requirement.  The crucial late-emerging dimension is the emergence of ideology, and not ontology, 
as central to the objectivity of language.  This reinforces the idea that the public use of language—
not its capacity to encode propositions or refer to objects—is the fundamental thing.   
The upshot is that there simply isn’t a straightforward relation between Quine’s mature view and 
the Publicity Requirement.3  His view, to misquote his ‘Relativism and Absolutism’, is that it ‘involves 
both public and private strains' (1984, 319).   My task is to identify these in more detail.  
  
2.   
That ‘[L]anguage is a social art’ might seem to suggest that for meaning we should look beyond the 
individual to the linguistic community, that meaning is some sense resides out there, or that 
meaning is a feature of languages that have their being as sets of practices, norms or patterns of 
collective behavior.  Another famous quotation from Word and Object runs:  
Different persons growing up in the same language are like different bushes trimmed and 
trained to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of twigs and 
branches will fulfill the elephantine form differently from bush to bush, but the overall 
outward results are alike. (1960, 8) 
But despite such remarks, and the occasional reference to pre-Chomskian thinkers such as Kenneth 
Pike or Benjamin Whorf, or indeed to Wittgenstein, Quine generally keeps his sights on the 
individual and does not propose anything like a systematic theory of language as a social institution.  
He continued to maintain the view expressed in 1978:  
Cognitive equivalence for the individual … is the prior notion conceptually …Two occasion 
sentences are equivalent for him if he is disposed, on every occasion of query, to give them 
matching verdicts or, on doubtful occasions, no verdict. The summation over society comes 
afterward: the sentences are equivalent for the language if equivalent for each speaker 
taken separately. (1979 [1978], 4) 
In this section I will largely follow him in this, returning to the way in which Quine does think of 
language as depending on the ways of the community near the end.  I’ll first identify the reasons 
that militate against thinking of him as  accepting the Publicity Requirement as stated above. Two 
points, a short one and a longer one.  
The short point is that at the level of observation sentences—and this is where the Publicity 
Requirement would seem to bite the hardest—there is no reference.  Not intrinsically.  In the spirit 
of the language-games of the early parts of the Philosophical Investigations,  we might think of a 
possible creature conversant with ‘red’, ‘Mama’, ‘rabbit’, and so on—a creature who assents to 
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‘rabbit?’ when and only when a rabbit is manifest, and similarly with respect to other observation 
sentences (where ‘rabbit’ and the like are thought of as one-word sentences, roughly equivalent to  
‘There’s a rabbit!’ etc.), without commanding any other  linguistic devices, and without properly 
referring to any objects at all.  We ourselves approximated to such creatures when we first acquired 
language.  It’s only at a more sophisticated level, when quantifiers, pronouns, and more generally 
the ‘apparatus of individuation’ begin to enter in, that a creature—idealising tremendously of 
course—must be credited with the power to refer (see Roots of Reference, Quine 1973, 81-92).  All 
reification, all objects, properly speaking, are in a this sense theoretical—there is a continuum from 
familiar ‘posits’ we gain the capacity to refer to as a matter of course such as ordinary bodies, to the 
more abstruse posits we refer to more deliberately such as quasars or quarks.  They differ 
epistemologically only by degree.  Indeed another way of denying the creature at this basic level the 
power of reference is to say that such a creature has no ontology at all (which is not to say the 
creature has no ‘ideology’; see ‘Ontology and Ideology Revisited’ in which Quine speaks of 
‘perceptual ideology’: 1983, 317).  
The longer point is that in ‘Propositional Objects’ [1965], with considerably more detail in the Roots 
of Reference (1973), and in all subsequent writings which treat of the topic, it is quite clear that 
Quine thinks unequivocally of the stimulus meaning of an observation sentence as the stimulation of 
‘some subset of the subject’s sensory receptors’ (1990b, 370).  It is not as clear in Word and Object 
of 1960, and one might take the view there to be that the stimulus meaning of ‘red’ is, roughly, a 
type of stimulation common to all occasions of use of the word by competent users.  If users of the 
word are subject to the same stimulation of red light, then they will react with the same 
disposition—the disposition to assent to the question ‘red?’ if asked (hiving off the occasional 
counterexample and ignoring other complexities).  But, as Quine came to emphasise in the 1965 
piece—and in accord with the passage quoted above in ‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions’ of 1975, 
closely considered—he meant the neurological idea.  And the ‘same stimulation’ cannot be the firing 
of each relevant person’s sensory receptors on the relevant occasions, because that is to assume 
that every relevant person has an exactly or roughly similar layout of sensory receptors, which Quine 
explicitly acknowledged that they do not, and in any case the neural layout of the individual 
language-user should not matter for matters of meaning and translation.   We ought for example to 
be able to translate a porpoise, if their squeaks do add up to language.   
Accordingly Quine settled for a notion of stimulus meaning for observation sentences that is 
relativized to the individual user (‘the stimulus meaning of s for A’),  and counted a sentence as 
observational for a community just in case it is observational  for each member and ‘if each would 
agree in assenting to it, or dissenting, on witnessing the occasion of its utterance’ (1992, 42—this 
addition is to avoid the drawback that a sentence could be observational for all concerned without 
the speakers’ being disposed to assent to it in just the same situations; 1992, 43).  From our point of 
view, the apparent trouble seems to be that whereas the presence of a rabbit is plainly a public 
event, the stimulation of one’s sensory receptors is not, as Quine stressed from 1965 onwards.   
‘Rabbit’ might be an observation sentence for one individual and also for another individual, and of 
the community containing the two, but why are these one-word sentences not merely accidental 
homonyms?  Why is it that we do often get sameness of response when ‘witnessing the occasion’?  
It’s unlikely to be mere coincidence, but so far we have no insight into what brings about the 
concord.  One who is impressed with Wittgenstein or even by the passages quoted at the outset by 
Quine himself might think it is essential that such sentences be shared amongst different people 
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more intimately.  It has not really been explained how the Publicity Requirement is to be satisfied in 
Quine’s scheme in cases where it is satisfied. 
For some readers, in 1990-2 Quine made things more desperate by rejecting Davidson’s suggestion 
that the relevant stimulations be identified with the common cause of our respective assents to the 
queried observation sentence—e.g. the presence of a rabbit.  There are two reasons why he rejected 
it.  First, Quine’s treatment of this issue is motivated by his epistemological aim of describing how 
we go from stimulus—the relatively ‘meagre stimuli’ (1969b, 83) that one is actually subjected to—
to science—to the ’torrential output’ (ibid), the vastly complicated and interconnected linguistic 
dispositions in which one’s scientific knowledge consists (see Roots of Reference pp. 2-3, From 
Stimulus to Science p. 16).   Part of the epistemologist’s project is to explain or to describe the finer 
structure of the ability to talk about distal objects, to describe the facts underlying the capacity for 
reference or for reification.  It is out of the question for this purpose to simply assume it outright 
(1996, 475 and 1999, 159-61; also we refer to many objects without their being in the relevant way a 
cause of our linguistic behaviour—e.g. numbers, and objects which are very distant or very small).   
Second, many observation sentences, such as ‘It’s raining’ or ‘It’s cold’, lack a suitable object such as 
a rabbit.  To the idea that situations might be invoked for the purpose of interpreting these, Quine 
demurs on the grounds that ‘[T]hey are of a piece with facts and propositions’, which Quine 
famously rejects for want of satisfactory criteria of identity (1993, 416; in Pursuit of Truth he wrote ‘I 
am put off by the vagueness of shared situations’, 1992, 42).    
A likely reply to the first point is that the mere fact that a deeper analysis of the ability to refer is 
possible does not preclude that the notion be used in semantics.  Thus Quine’s argument for the 
inscrutability of reference looms large here (for ‘ontological relativity’; Quine came to see the terms 
as equivalent).  For reference cannot, according to the argument, play a substantive role in linguistic 
explanation, as a way of tying mind securely to objects.  Although reference, one might think, is 
fundamental to any adequate account of language, and the reference of words is what provides the 
public anchor points of language, Quine finds serious fault with this story.  Assume for simplicity that 
we can speak interchangeably of a theory or a language.  If a person’s theory consists of the sum 
total of the person’s dispositions to assent or dissent with respect to the declarative sentences of his 
language, then the factuality of the theory cannot be explained in terms of the particular objects 
referred to.  For there is no detectable difference between certain reference schemes which 
materially disagree on the extension of the reference relation.  Begin with any scheme, select any 
‘proxy-function’—a permutation of the domain of the reference relation such as ‘is the cosmic 
complement of’—re-interpret the predicates correspondingly so that for example ‘Fa’ has the effect 
of ‘The proxy of a is a proxy of an F’; then the truth-value of each sentence is unaffected.  What is 
invariant through such transformations is the structure of the reference relation, not which objects 
are denoted by which terms.  (Moreover, if the sense or meaning one is credited with depends only 
on the sum of one’s linguistic dispositions then the argument shows that reference is not 
determined by sense or meaning; 1990a, 361).   
Thus it looks as if Quine by 1992 in effect had rescinded any commitment he might have had to the 
Publicity Requirement as stated above.  The epistemological project, as Quine then saw it, would not 
be stymied by what is in effect the privacy or rather the idiosyncrasy of stimulus meaning (since 
stimulations are in principle available to the third-person methods of science, even if in practice they 
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are unknown).  In a section of Pursuit of Truth revealingly called ‘To each his own’, he writes ‘The 
view that I have come to, regarding intersubjective likeness of stimulation, is … that we can simply 
do without it.’ (1992, 42).  
 
3.  Quine’s position at this juncture, after this problem had rankled for thirty years, was as he 
recognised not altogether satisfactory (1999, 161).  But after 1992, partly in consequence of an 
exchange with Garry Ebbs (2016), Quine came to think that a hero of naturalism in biology, Charles 
Darwin, could be invoked as showing a way round the problem of the idiosyncrasy of stimulus 
meaning.    
In ‘I, You and It’ (1995) he conditionally defined sameness of interpersonal perceptual standards as 
follows (with intrapersonal similarity already defined): If a given outer event at different times 
produces neural events in X that are similar in X and likewise produces neural events in Y that are 
similar in Y, and the same result is repeated in other occasions, then that is evidence that the 
perceptual standards are shared between X and Y (1995, 486), despite the inevitable neurological 
differences between them.  Experiments can confirm what is in any event obvious, that that state of 
affairs obtains, but Quine sees Darwin as offering a naturalistic explanation.  Having natural needs 
and interests in common, and living as we do in a shared environment, our species has evolved 
habits of being responsive to certain things immediately in view rather than others.  Thus you and I 
are programmed by natural selection to tend to attend to such things as a rabbit emerging into view, 
and not typically a random bit of sky, even though the precise anatomical details will differ between 
us.  Fundamentally it’s no different from the fact that despite our anatomical differences, we equally 
learn to walk, prefer the taste of sugar to that of turpentine, and recoil at loud noises.   
This is what Quine, wilfully invoking Leibniz, called the ‘pre-established harmony’ of perception 
(1995b, 23-32; 1995c, 33-6; 1996, 473-6; 1999, 486-92; 2000a, 493-7; 1995a, 20-1).  Although Quine 
does not make either of these points himself, this would help to account for the ease with which 
children learn language and the apparent inter-translatability of all human languages (abstracting 
from rhetorical and poetic differences).  Quine says that it extends also to such stimulations as the 
vocalized phoneme ‘Rain’;  stimulations of that sort will also tend amongst humans—with 
qualifications of context and so on—to be grouped together as similar (1996, 475; 1999, 486; 1997a, 
184; 1997b, 480).  He was confident that despite the unedifying immensity and complexity of the 
task, the facts in which pre-established harmony consists are in principle explicable at the neural 
level and also at the genetic level; much of the philosophical value of Darwin’s contribution is the 
erasure of any but ordinary causation in the explanation of biological phenomena. Natural selection 
was Darwin’s great ‘solvent of metaphysics’ (1996, 475).  
The Publicity Requirement therefore does not fit neatly into Quine’s account, at least not in the way 
formulated at the beginning, but now we can see that it is not necessary directly to meet it.  With 
the story laid out in full, the clamour for an unequivocal decision yea or nay on whether Quine 
advocates the fundamental publicity of meaning or language dies down.   The public environment is 
presupposed by pre-established harmony, which is accounted for by natural selection.  And pre-
established harmony accounts for why the ordinary translator can ‘blithely’ assume the common 
public  object, such as the rabbit, as the referent ‘no questions asked’ (1996, 474). But for Quine 
reference and meaning are a distraction from a more penetrating explanation.  The ‘Publicity of 
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Meaning’ is partly a misleading slogan, a smokescreen, a diversion from the phenomenon it 
promises to elucidate.  Once the environment is in place—with all its rabbits, states of the weather 
and other features, things which the Publicity Requirement insists upon as figuring in the fine-
grained explanation of language—Quine’s story deals primarily with proximate matters.  Those 
matters are fundamentally individualistic, idiosyncratic or internal.  Publicity is an initial way of 
characterising what language is, but it requires investigation to discover what it ultimately comes to.  
It is a ladder that is for the most part kicked away in the end—not a principle that is fundamental to 
the functioning of language that must remain intact as we dig deeper.  If we dig deeper, we do not 
find anything literally shareable, or exactly similar in the way that would be required by the doctrine 
of common meanings.  What emerges is the importance, for the functioning of language, of the pre-
established harmony of perceptual standards, the fact that our species is wired up just so by the 
processes of natural selection.  It is the existence of such facts that underlies our common language, 
of our common world, if by that phrase we mean the world of ideas, symbols, and theories.  
 
4.   I suggested earlier that a Quinean accommodation of the intersubjectivity of language, of 
objective communication, lies not in reference, not in ontology or in a shared ontology, but in 
‘ideology’—the ‘logos of ideas’—which for Quine is the lexicographical or predicative structure of 
one’s language or theory  (Quine 1952, 1983).   The objectivity or intersubjectivity of language does 
not hang on either its reference or on the stimulus meaning of observation sentences.   Neither is up 
to the task.  What does reflect its objectivity, what survives variations in reference and stimulus 
meaning, is the use of predicates or general terms—that where I say ‘rabbit’ you say something 
identifiable phonologically as the same as my ‘rabbit’.    It is where we began, with the use of 
language, with linguistic behaviour, despite the detour.  Once again, the idiosyncrasy of stimulation 
enters in because even in the case of theoretical sentences, whether or not a hearer assents to it will 
depend partly on whether they hear the sound itself correctly, a matter of their capacity for 
phonological perception.  And the exercise of that capacity generally presupposes that the speaker is 
a normal language-user and situated in a normal context, both linguistic and non-linguistic.  In other 
words, objectivity itself presupposes the world to be more or less as we think, which is part and 
parcel of naturalism.   There is no deeper fact underlying the objectivity of language.  Language 
cannot explain objectivity or the availability of a common world so much as reflect it; that is itself a 
presupposition of naturalism.  
However the question remains of what exactly determines a language-user’s adoption of a particular 
ideology, of how they make their own a particular structure of predicates rather than some other.  
How much leeway is left for its being partly a matter of the specific linguistic environment?  From 
early on Quine was influenced by the American structural linguists and behavioural linguists, who 
viewed the linguistic capacity as the result of the interaction between the individual and the 
linguistic community but accorded the lion’s share to social facts of the linguistic community (with 
the more extreme view being represented by Whorf).  But by the 1980’s Quine tended to back away 
from any grand pronouncements is this area, and with the doctrine of pre-established harmony—
this is speculation—the appeal of behavioural or structural linguistics must have subsided.  What 
remains true is that although the learning of language is a social affair, the teacher teaches the pupil 
to acquire their own linguistic facility.  In the case of teaching an observation sentence, for example, 
the teacher helps or guides the child—oftentimes merely by example—to acquire a stimulus 
meaning for the sentence by learning to associate phonemes with their own stimuli. 4   
To appear in Protosociology 
8 
 
Now describing Quine as holding that the essential facts of language are not fundamentally social or 
public might seem to set the stage for some reconciliation with Chomsky. The relation between 
Quine’s philosophy of language and Chomsky-style linguistics, and to cognitive science generally, is a 
gigantic subject, but to close I think there is one point that I can briefly sketch. It has again to do with 
ideology.  
Quine is deeply sceptical about the Chomskean project, especially about the depth and level of 
explanation achievable in linguistics.  In various ways, Chomsky strenuously rebuts Quine’s criticisms 
as well as the philosophical positions he takes to be behind them, as is more than evident in 
Chomsky’s various articles from 1969 to the 2000’s which discuss Quine (e.g. Chomsky 1969, 2000).  
Most centrally, he continues to maintain his view that behind human linguistic ability is a cognitive, 
mental, innate, language-specific apparatus that is presupposed by that competence, and which 
makes it possible for children to learn a first language so rapidly.  The word ‘mental’ is not supposed 
to be anything but an informal marker of the sorts of phenomena meant. To puzzle out the structure 
of this innate mental endowment, this ‘organ’, is a central task of the science of linguistics; the 
development of the internal linguistic organ is more properly characterized as a matter of growth 
than learning or acquisition from the environment.  So it is to elucidate the core linguistic capacity of 
a mature speaker, his ‘I-language’ (‘internal language’), as distinct from the relatively accidental or 
ancillary ‘E-language’ (‘external language’), confined to the morphology, phonology and superficial 
syntax of particular languages such as Japanese.  The models linguists develop are abstract, but they 
are intended as real descriptions of mental equipment, which need not ever be items of explicit 
awareness on the part of the subject.   
There are many points at which Quine criticized the programme.  But still, as described above, Quine 
recognised the need to posit a significant amount of innate structure (like any serious modern 
empiricist or behaviourist, in his estimation).  Indeed in ‘Linguistics and Philosophy’ (1968, 56-8)—
before he formulated the doctrine of pre-established harmony—Quine stresses his agreement with 
Chomsky’s celebration of rationalism;  it’s in ‘no conflict with latter-day attitudes that are associated 
with the name of empiricism, or behaviorism’ (p. 56). ‘This qualitative spacing of stimulations must 
therefore be recognized as an innate structure needed in accounting for any learning, and hence, in 
particular, language-learning’ (p. 57), especially the ‘inductive instinct’:  Even Watson and Skinner 
saw that the inductive instinct—the Humean tendency to expect like to follow like—is presupposed 
by the ability to learn and therefore cannot itself be learned.   Therefore, since both theorists accept 
the existence of a substantive innate endowment, is there not some meeting of minds? Are they not 
both private, internal, or individualistic theorists, in the sense described earlier?  Is not the reason 
we can communicate that we each have roughly the same cognitive hardware, not the other way 
round?  
Not for Quine, because for him there is still plenty of room for the requisite cognitive capacities to 
be learned from the environment rather than innate, and for language to be ‘socially inculcated and 
controlled’ (1969, 81).   The Quinean story I’ve told is consistent with the rampant historical 
contingency of the structure of language.  As Quine formulates it, the role of pre-established 
harmony of perception might not extend beyond obvious things like thunder or the presence of 
rabbits.  And it does not automatically extend to language as such;  in particular not to grammar or 
syntax, even if it does presumably extend to phonology. For such things, it is not ruled out that 
linguistic experience figures much more centrally in accounting for linguistic competence than it ever 
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could for Chomsky.   It is not ruled out that the general or non-domain specific inductive instinct, 
together with relatively generic innate quality spaces, are for Quine adequate for learning the ways 
of language.  Thus it is not ruled out that language—in its ideological aspect—remains public or 
cultural, propagated though time as a collection of memes.  
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1 Quine does not deny the existence of private sensations. In ‘Meaning in Linguistics’ his position is merely that 
private colour sensations—an example of what came to be called ‘qualia’—are neither here nor there for the 
meanings of colour terms; the meaning of those is public. 
2 ‘Use and Its Place in Meaning’ 43-54 (this is the version in Theories and Things – not the Erkenntnis version or  
the version that appears in a volume edited by Margalit 1979.  
3 It’s pointed out in detail in my Quine versus Davidson (2012).  
 
4 Can we not show the Publicity Requirement to be satisfied by appealing to the importance in Quine’s account 
of empathy in the learning of language?  Quine did say in Pursuit of Truth:  
Empathy dominates the learning of language, both by child and by field linguist. In the child’s case it is 
the parent’s empathy… We all have an uncanny knack for emphathizing another’s perceptual 
situation, however ignorant of the physiological or optical mechanism of his perception. (p. 42)  
But for one thing, the possession of language is, so to speak, logically independent of the details of how it is in 
fact acquired.  Learning a skill is not the same as possessing the skill.  For another, we would have the same 
problem as we had with the intersubjectivity of stimulus meaning: The ‘physiological or optical mechanism’ of 
its perception surely varies, irrelevantly, from individual to individual.  
 
